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Since the 1980s, computers have had increasing roles in all aspects of human life—including an in-volvement in criminal acts. This 
development has led to the rise of digital 
forensics, the uncovering and examina-
tion of evidence located on all things 
electronic with digital storage, including 
computers, cell phones, and networks. 
Digital forensics researchers and practi-
tioners stand at the forefront of some of 
the most challenging problems in com-
puter science, including “big data” anal-
ysis, natural language processing, data 
visualizations, and cybersecurity. 
Compared with traditional forensic 
science, digital forensics poses signifi-
cant challenges. Information on a com-
puter system can be changed without 
a trace, the scale of data that must be 
analyzed is vast, and the variety of data 
types is enormous. Just as a traditional 
forensic investigator must be prepared 
to analyze any kind of smear or frag-
ment, no matter the source, a digital 
investigator must be able to make sense 
of any data that might be found on any 
device anywhere on the planet—a very 
difficult proposition.
From its inception, digital forensics 
has served two different purposes, each 
with its own difficulties. First, in many 
cases computers contain evidence of 
a crime that took place in the physical 
world. The computer was all but inci-
dental—except that computerization has 
made the evidence harder for investiga-
tors to analyze than paper records. For 
example, financial scam artist Bernard 
Madoff kept track of his victims’ ac-
counts by using an IBM AS/400 mini-
computer from the 1980s. The age of the 
computer helped perpetuate his crime, 
because few people on Wall Street have 
experience with 25-year-old technology, 
and it created an added complication 
after Madoff was arrested, because in-
vestigators had few tools with which to 
make sense of his data. 
Today personal computers are so ubiq-
uitous that the collection and use of digi-
tal evidence has become a common part 
of many criminal and civil investigations. 
Suspects in murder cases routinely have 
their laptops and cell phones examined 
for corroborating evidence. Corporate 
litigation is also dominated by electronic 
discovery of incriminating material. 
The second class of digital forensics 
cases are those in which the crime was 
inherently one involving computer sys-
tems, such as hacking. In these instanc-
es, investigators are often hampered 
by the technical sophistication of the 
systems and the massive amount of evi-
dence to analyze.
Digital forensics is powerful because 
computer systems are windows into 
the past. Many retain vast quantities 
of information—either intentionally, in 
the form of log files and archives, or in-
advertently, as a result of software that 
does not cleanly erase memory and files. 
As a result, investigators can frequently 
recover old email messages, chat logs, 
Google search terms, and other kinds of 
data that were created weeks, months or 
even years before. Such contemporane-
ous records can reveal an individual’s 
state of mind or intent at the time the 
crime was committed.
But whereas pre-computer evidence, 
such as handwritten letters and photo-
graphs, could be reproduced and given 
to attorneys, judges, and juries, comput-
erized evidence requires special han-
dling and analysis. Electronic data are 
easily changed, damaged, or erased if 
handled improperly. Simply turning on 
a consumer GPS may cause the device 
to delete critical evidence. Additionally, 
computers frequently harbor hidden ev-
idence that may be revealed only when 
specialized tools are used—for example, 
a digital camera may appear to have 
30 photos, but expert examination may 
show another 300 deleted photos that 
can be recovered. (When a device “eras-
es” a file, it doesn’t clear the memory 
space, but notes that the space is avail-
able; the file may not be really deleted 
until a new one is written over it.)
Because they can look into the past 
and uncover hidden data, digital fo-
rensics tools are increasingly employed 
beyond the courtroom. Security pro-
fessionals routinely use such tools to 
analyze network intrusions—not to 
convict the attacker but to understand 
how the perpetrator gained access and 
to plug the hole. Data recovery firms 
rely on similar tools to resurrect files 
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from drives that have been inadver-
tently reformatted or damaged. Forensic 
tools can also detect the unintentional 
disclosures of personal information. In 
2009 the Inspector General of the U.S. 
Department of Defense issued a report 
stating that many hard drives were not 
properly wiped of data before leaving 
government service. 
Digital evidence can even be exam-
ined to show that something did not 
happen. Here they are less powerful, 
for the well-known reason that the ab-
sence of evidence is not the evidence 
of absence. In May 2006 a laptop and 
external hard drive containing sensitive 
personal information of 26.5 million 
veterans and military personnel was 
stolen from an employee at the U.S. De-
partment of Veterans Affairs. After the 
laptop was recovered in June 2006, fo-
rensic investigators analyzed the media 
and determined that the sensitive files 
probably had not been viewed. 
One way to make such a judgment is 
by examining the access and modifica-
tion times associated with each file on 
the hard drive. But someone taking ad-
vantage of the same forensic techniques 
could have viewed the laptop files with-
out modifying those timestamps, so the 
investigators really determined only that 
the files had not been opened by con-
ventional means.
These examples emphasize that 
the possibilites of digital forensics are 
bounded not by technology but by what 
is cost-effective for a particular case. 
Convictions are frequently the measure 
of success. In practice there is a consider-
able gap between what is theoretically 
possible and what is necessary; even 
though there may be an intellectual de-
sire to analyze every last byte, there is 
rarely a reason to do so.
Following Procedures
Digital forensics relies on a kit of tools 
and techniques that can be applied 
equally to suspects, victims, and by-
standers. A cell phone found on a dead 
body without identification would al-
most certainly be subjected to analysis, 
but so would a phone dropped during 
a house burglary. How the analysis is 
performed is therefore more a matter of 
legal issues than technological ones. As 
the field has grown, practitioners have 
tried to create a consistent but flexible 
approach for performing investigations, 
despite policy variations. Several such 
digital forensic models have been pro-
posed, but most have common elements. 
Before data can be analyzed, they 
are collected from the field (the “scene 
of the crime”), stabilized, and pre-
served to create a lasting record. Un-
derstanding the inner workings of 
how computers store data is key to 
accurate extraction and retention. Al-
though computers are based entirely 
on computations involving the bi-
nary digits 0 and 1, more commonly 
known as bits, modern computers do 
most of their work on groups of eight 
bits called bytes. A byte can represent 
the sequences 00000000, 00000001, 
00000010, through 11111111, which 
corresponds to the decimal numbers 
0 through 255 (there are two options, 0 
and 1, with eight combinations, so 28 = 
256). One common use for bytes inside 
the computer is to store written text, 
where each letter is represented by a 
specific binary code. UTF-8, a com-
mon representation, uses the binary 
sequence 00100001 to represent the let-
ter A, 00100010 for the letter B, and so 
on. (Computers often use hexadecimal 
codes in memory as well; see figure on 
page 373.)
High-tech crime fighting is now needed everywhere, as shown in this lab belonging to the 
West Virginia State Police Digital Forensics Unit. Police these days typically use powerful 
computers and software  to copy, analyze, and decrypt data from a suspect’s electronic devices. 
Craig Cunningham
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When recorded on a hard drive or 
memory card, these bytes are grouped 
in blocks called sectors that are typically 
512 or 4,096 bytes in length. A sector is 
the smallest block of data that a drive 
can read or write. Each sector on the disk 
has a unique identifying number, called 
the sector’s logical block address. An email 
message might require 10 or 20 sectors 
to store; a movie might require hundreds 
of thousands. A cell phone advertised as 
having “8 GB” of storage has 8 billion 
bytes or roughly 15 million sectors. 
Depending on the arrangement of 
other files on the device, the sectors can 
be stored as a single sequential stream 
or fragmented into many different loca-
tions. Other sectors contain informa-
tion that the computer uses to find the 
stored data; such bookkeeping mate-
rial is called file system metadata (literally 
“data about data”).
To preserve the data on a computer or 
phone, each of these sectors must be in-
dividually copied and stored on another 
computer in a single file called a disk 
image or physical image. This file, which 
contains every byte from the target de-
vice, naturally includes every visible 
file. But the physical image also records 
invisible files, as well as portions of files 
that have been deleted but not yet over-
written by the operating system. 
In cases involving networks instead 
of individual machines, the actual data 
sent over the network connection are 
preserved. Thus network forensics is 
equivalent to a wiretap—and, indeed, 
law enforcement is increasingly putting 
network forensics equipment to this use. 
The random access memory (RAM) 
associated with computer systems is 
also subject to forensic investigation. 
RAM gets its name because the data 
it stores can be accessed in any order. 
This fast access makes RAM particu-
larly useful as temporary storage and 
working space for a computer’s operat-
ing systems and programs. But RAM 
is difficult to work with, because its 
contents change very quickly and are 
lost when a computer is turned off. 
RAM must be captured with a dedi-
cated program (a memory imager) and 
is stored in its own special kind of file, 
called a memory dump. Although data 
in RAM can be extracted from all kinds 
of electronic systems—not just desk-
tops, laptops, and cell phones but also 
network communications equipment 
such as wireless routers—each of these 
systems uses different kinds of internal 
software structures, so programs de-
Famous criminal cas-es show the power of digital forensics, 
but a few also highlight 
the need for careful han-
dling of data and devices.
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2000, John Diamond shot 
and killed Air Force Cap-
tain Marty Theer. The vic-
tim’s wife, Michelle Theer 
(right), was implicated in 
the crime, but there was 
no eyewitness evidence. 
What prosecutors did have was 88,000 
emails and instant messages on her 
computer, including clear evidence of 
a sexual relationship between Theer 
and Diamond, and messages docu-
menting the conspiracy to murder her 
husband. Theer was found guilty on 
December 3, 2004, of murder and con-
spiracy and sentenced to life in prison.
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more than 30 years, Dennis Rader 
(above), a serial killer in Kansas, re-
emerged, took another victim, and 
then sent police a floppy disk with a 
letter on it. On the disk forensic in-
vestigators found a deleted Micro-
soft Word file. That file’s metadata 
contained the name “Dennis” as the 
last person to modify the deleted file 
and a link to a Lutheran church where 
Rader was a deacon. (Ironically, Rader 
had sent a floppy disk because he had 
been previously told, by the police 
themselves, that letters on floppy 
disks could not be traced.)
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kidnapped and imprisoned 13-year-
old Alicia Kozakiewicz. He sent an 
instant message of a 
photograph showing 
Kozakiewicz to another 
man, who contacted the 
FBI and provided the 
Yahoo! screen name of 




Yahoo! to obtain the IP 
address for the person 
who had used the screen 
name, then contacted Ve-
rizon to learn the name and physical 
address of the subscriber to whom 
that IP address had been assigned, 
leading them to Tyree.
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body of Nancy Cooper was found. Her 
husband, Brad Cooper (below), was 
charged with the crime. This time the 
role of digital data was more compli-
cated. Local police, who did not seek 
expert assistance, accidentally erased 
the victim’s phone while attempting 
to access it. Brad Cooper maintains he 
went to the grocery store on the morn-
ing of his wife’s death, and that she 
called him during that time, but pros-
ecutors charged that he had the tech-
nical expertise and access to the nec-
essary equipment to fake such a call. 
Investigators searching Brad Cooper’s 
computer also found zoomed-in satel-
lite images of the area where his wife’s 
body was discovered, downloaded 
one day before she was reported miss-
ing. Defense attorneys countered that 
searches done on that and surround-
ing days contained inaccurate time-
stamps. Brad Cooper was convicted of 
murder, although appeals are ongoing. 
Major Convictions, and a Few 
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signed to analyze one may not work 
on another. And even though forensics 
researchers have developed approaches 
for ensuring the forensic integrity of 
drive copies, currently there is no wide-
ly accepted approach for mathemati-
cally ensuring a RAM dump.
Preserving the data is only the first 
step in the process. Next, an examin-
er has to explore for information that 
might be relevant to the investigation. 
Most examinations are performed 
with tools that can extract user files 
from the disk image, search for files 
that contain a specific word or phrase 
in a variety of human languages, and 
even detect the presence of encrypted 
data. Relevant data are then extracted 
from the preserved system so they are 
easier to analyze. 
Testable Results
Just two decades ago, there were no 
digital forensics tools as we know 
them today. Instead, practitioners had 
to repurpose tools that had been de-
veloped elsewhere. For example, disk 
backup software was used for collec-
tion and preservation, and data recov-
ery tools were used for media analysis. 
Although these approaches worked, 
they lacked control, repeatability, and 
known error rates. 
The situation began to change in 1993. 
That year, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
in the case of Daubert v. Merrell Phar-
maceutical that any scientific testimony 
presented in court must be based on 
a theory that is testable, that has been 
scrutinized and found favorable by the 
scientific community, that has a known 
or potential error rate, and that is gener-
ally accepted. Although the case didn’t 
directly kick off the demand for digi-
tal forensics tools, it gave practitioners 
grounds for arguing that validated tools 
were needed not just for good science 
and procedure but as a matter of law. 
Since then there has been a steady devel-
opment of techniques for what has come 
to be called technical exploitation. 
Probably the single most transfor-
mative technical innovation in the 
field has been the introduction of hash 
functions, first as a means for ensuring 
the integrity of forensic data, and later 
as a way to recognize specific files.
In computer science a hash function 
maps a sequence of characters (called a 
string) to a binary number of a specific 
size—that is, a fixed number of bits. 
A 16-bit hash function can produce 
216 = 65,536 different values, whereas 
a 32-bit hash function can produce 
232 = 4,294,967,296 possible values. 
Hash functions are designed so that 
changing a single character in the input 
results in a completely different out-
put. Although many different strings 
will have the same hash value—some-
thing called a hash collision—the more 
bits in the hash, the smaller the chance 
of such an outcome. (The name hash 
comes from the way hash functions are 
typically implemented as a two-step 
process that first chops and then mixes 
the data, much the same way one might 
make hash in the kitchen.)
Hashing was invented by Hans Pe-
ter Luhn and first described in a 1953 
IBM technical memo; it’s been widely 
used for computerized text processing 
since the 1960s. For example, because 
Each system uses a different kind of 
internal memory structure, so programs 
designed to analyze one may not  
work on another.
Colors on a web page are indicated using hexadecimal representation, a base 16 system in 
which the numerals for 10 to 15 represented by A to F so they are not confused with single-
digit numbers). Such computer notation is also commonly of use in digital forensics. The 
number of digits in a hexadecimal code indicates the power to which the base 16 is raised, 
so for example, 3BF9 means (3 x 163) + (11 x 162) + (15 x 161) + (9 x 160) or 15,353. Hexadecimal 
represents the numbers 0 to 255 as the codes 00 through FF (15 × 16 + 15 = 255). JPEG files gen-
erated by digital cameras typically begin with the sequence FF D8 FF E0 and end with FF D9. 
(Image courtesy of VisiBone; colors in this reproduction are approximated.)
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every sentence in a document can be 
treated as a string, hashing makes 
it possible to rapidly see if the same 
paragraph ever repeats in a long docu-
ment: Just compute the hash value for 
each paragraph, put all of the hashes 
into a list, sort the list, and see if any 
number occurs two or more times. 
If there is no repeat, then no para-
graph is duplicated. If a number does 
repeat, then it’s necessary to look at 
the corresponding paragraphs to de-
termine whether the text really does 
appear twice, or the duplicate is a the 
result of a hash collision. Using hashes 
in this manner is quicker than work-
ing directly with the paragraphs be-
cause it is much faster for computers 
to compare numbers than sequences of 
words—even when you account for the 
time to perform the hashing.
In 1979, Ralph Merkle, then a Stan-
ford University doctoral student, in-
vented a way to use hashing for com-
puter security. Merkle’s idea was to 
use a hash function that produced 
more than 100 bits of output and ad-
ditionally had the property of being 
one-way. That is, it was relatively easy 
to compute the hash of a string, but it 
was nearly impossible, given a hash, 
to find a corresponding string. The es-
sence of Merkle’s idea was to use a 
document’s 100-bit one-way hash as 
a stand-in for the document itself. In-
stead of digitally certifying a 50-page 
document, for example, the document 
could be reduced to a 100-bit hash, 
which could then be certified. Because 
there are so many different possible 
hash values (2100 is about 1030 combi-
nations), Merkle reasoned that an at-
tacker could not take the digital signa-
ture from one document and use it to 
certify a second document—because 
to do so would require that both docu-
ments had the same hash value.
Merkle got his degree, and today 
digital signatures applied to hashes are 
the basis of many cybersecurity sys-
tems. They protect credit card numbers 
sent over the Internet, certify the au-
thenticity and integrity of code run on 
iPhones, and validate keys used play 
digital music. 
The idea of hashing has been applied 
to other areas as well—in particular, 
forensics. One of the field’s first and 
continuing uses of hashing was to es-
tablish chain of custody for forensic data. 
Instead of hashing a document or a file, 
the hash function is applied to the en-
tire disk image. Many law enforcement 
organizations will create two disk im-
ages of a drive and then compute the 
hash of each image. If the values match, 
then the copies are assumed to each 
be a true copy of the data that were on 
the drive. Any investigator with a later 
copy of the data can calculate the hash 
and see if it matches the original report-
ed value. Hashing is so important that 
many digital forensics tools automati-
cally perform this comparison.
A second use for hashing is to identify 
specific files. This approach takes advan-
tage of the property that it is extraordi-
narily unlikely for two files to have the 
same hash value, so they can label files 
in much the same way a person can be 
recognized by their fingerprints. 
Today forensic practitioners distribute 
databases containing file hashes. These 
data sets can be used to identify known 
goods, such as programs distributed as 
part of operating systems, or known bads, 
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Fragments of files that have been compressed can still be recovered, even when significant reas-
sembly data are missing. One approach creates a model of the ways that a document might be 
decompressed based on the underlying mathematics, then chooses between the options, using a 
human language model. (Text courtesy of Ralf Brown, Carnegie Mellon University.)
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ments, or child pornography. Recently, 
several groups, including my team at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, have ap-
plied cryptographic hashing to blocks of 
data smaller than files, taking advantage 
of the fact that even relatively short 512-
byte and 4,096-byte segments of files can 
be highly identifying. 
File and sector identification with 
hashing means that a hard drive contain-
ing millions of files can be automatically 
searched against a database contain-
ing the hashes of hundreds of millions 
of files in a relatively short amount of 
time, perhaps just a few 
hours. The search can be 




tions start with the exam-
iner looking for files be-
longing to the computer’s 
previous user. 
Allocated files are ones 
that can be viewed 
through the file system 
and whose contents under 
normal circumstances will 
not be inadvertently over-
written by the operating 
system. The word allocated 
refers to the disk sectors 
in which the file’s content 
is stored, which are dedi-
cated to this particular file 
and cannot be assigned to 
others. Many digital forensics tools al-
low the examiner to see allocated files 
present in a disk image without having 
to use the computer’s native operating 
system, which maintains forensic integ-
rity of the evidence.
One of the major technical digital fo-
rensics innovations of the past 15 years 
has been approaches for recovering a 
file after it is deleted. These files are not 
simply in a computer’s “trash can” or 
“recycle bin,” but have been removed 
by emptying the trash. File names can be 
hidden, and the storage associated with 
the files is deallocated. But a file’s con-
tents sometimes can remain on the hard 
drive, in memory, or on external media, 
even though the metadata that could 
be used to locate it are lost. Recovering 
these kinds of data requires a technique 
called file carving, invented around 1999 
by independent security researcher Dan 
Farmer, and now widely used.
The first file carvers took advantage 
of the fact that many file types contain 
characteristic sequences of bytes at the 
beginning and end of each file. Such se-
quences are called file headers and footers. 
The file carver scans the disk image for 
these headers and footers. When ones 
are found, the two sequences of bytes 
and all of the data between them are 
saved in a new file.
Modern carvers can validate the data 
that they are carving (for example, to 
make sure that the bytes between the 
JPEG header and footer can be actually 
displayed as a digital photograph) and 
can even reassemble files that are broken 
into multiple pieces. Such fragment recov-
ery carving is computationally challeng-
ing because the number of ways that 
fragments can be realigned; the result is 
a combinatorial explosion as the size of 
the media increases. Missing fragments 
further complicate the problem.
Closely related to file carving is the 
problem of reconstructing compressed 
data. Compression is a technique that is 
widely used on computer systems to 
squeeze data so that it takes up less 
space. The technique exploits redun-
dancy; for example, if asked to com-
press the character sequence “humble 
humbleness,” a computer might replace 
the six characters of the second instance 
of “humble” with a pointer to the first 
occurrence. English text typically com-
presses to one-sixth its original size.
Text must be compressed with lossless 
algorithms, programs that faithfully re-
store the original text when the data are 
decompressed. However, photographs 
and videos are typically compressed 
with lossy systems that exploit deficien-
cies in the human perceptual system. For 
example, a few dozen pixels of slightly 
different colors might be replaced by a 
single rectangle of uniform hue. The re-
sulting savings can be immense. With-
out compression an hour of full-screen 
video might require 99 gigabytes but 
with compression the same video might 
take up only 500 megabytes—roughly 
1/200th the original size. 
The primary challenge posed by com-
pression is recovering data when the 
compressed file is corrupted or partially 
missing. Just five years 
ago such corruption fre-
quently made it impossi-
ble to recover anything of 
use, but lately there have 
been dramatic advances 
in this area. 
In 2009 Husrev Sencar 
of TOBB University of 
Economics and Technol-
ogy in Turkey and Nasir 
Memon of the Polytech-
nic Institute of New York 
University developed an 
approach that can show a 
fragment of a JPEG digi-
tal photograph even if the 
beginning and end of the 
file are missing. In 2011 
Ralf Brown of Carnegie 
Mellon University devel-
oped an approach for re-
covering data from frag-
ments of files compressed 
with the common ZIP or DEFLATE 
algorithms, even when critical informa-
tion needed for reassembly is missing. 
Brown’s approach creates a model of 
the many different ways that a docu-
ment might be decompressed based on 
the underlying mathematics of com-
pression, and then chooses between the 
different possible documents based on 
a second model of the human language 
in which the document is written (see 
figure on page 374).
Recovering files in temporary com-
puter memory can also be illuminat-
ing for digital evidence. The RAM of 
a desktop, laptop, or cell phone is a 
mosaic of 4,096-byte blocks that vari-
ously contain running program code, 
remnants of programs that recently ran 
and have closed, portions of the operat-
ing system, fragments of what was sent 
and received over the network, pieces 
of windows displayed on the screen, 
the copy-and-paste buffer, and other 
kinds of information. Memory changes 
Forensics tools allow investigators to directly access memory chips removed 
from devices such as mobile phones, satellite navigation devices, car electron-
ics, and USB flash drives. This technique can be used to recover data from 
devices that have been physically damaged or are password protected. (Image 
courtesy of the Netherlands Forensic Institute.)
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rapidly—typical memory 
systems support several 
billion changes per sec-
ond—so it is nearly im-
possible to make a copy 
that is internally consis-
tent without halting the 
machine. An added com-
plication is that the very 
specific manner by which 
programs store informa-
tion in memory is rarely 
documented and changes 
between one version of 
a program and another. 
As a result, each version 
may need to be painstak-
ingly reverse-engineered 
by computer forensics re-
searchers. Thus, memory 
analysis is time consum-
ing, very difficult, and 
necessarily incomplete.
Despite these challenges, recent years 
have seen the development of tech-
niques for acquiring and analyzing the 
contents of a running computer system, 
a process called memory parsing. Today 
there are open-source and proprietary 
tools that can report the system time 
when a memory dump was captured, 
display a list of running processes, and 
even show the contents of the comput-
er’s clipboard and screen. Such tools 
are widely used for reverse-engineer-
ing malware, such as computer viruses 
and worms, as well as understanding 
an attacker’s actions in computer in-
trusion cases. Memory parsing can be 
combined with file carving to recover 
digital photographs and video.
Reverse engineering is another impor-
tant part of digital forensics because 
software and hardware developers gen-
erally do not provide the public with 
details of how their systems work. As 
a result, considerable effort is needed 
to backtrack through systems code and 
understand how data are stored. To-
day’s techniques to extract allocated 
files from disk images were largely de-
veloped through this method. 
System analysis is the second leg of 
forensic research. It’s similar to reverse 
engineering, but the fundamental differ-
ence is that the information the analyst 
seeks may be unknown to the develop-
ers themselves. Although this idea may 
seem strange, remember that comput-
ers are complicated systems: Just as pro-
grammers frequently put bugs in their 
code without real-
izing it, programs 
invariably have 
other behaviors 
that aren’t bugs 
but are equally 
unforeseen by the 
original creators. 
Many system us-
ers and quite a 
few developers as-
sumed that it was 
not possible to restore deleted files until 
data recovery experts developed tools 
that proved otherwise.
Image Integrity
Even when photos and video can be 
recovered from a subject’s computer or 
cell phone, another question to consider 
is whether the imagery 
is real. Photographs 
were doctored long be-
fore the advent of Pho-
toshop. For example, in 
the era of Soviet Russia, 
after he was purged by 
Stalin, Bolshevik offi-
cial Avel Enukidze was 
carefully removed from 
official photographs 
through a series of skill-
ful manipulations of 
light and negatives in 
a Kremlin darkroom. 
Computer animation 
now takes such manip-
ulation to a completely 
new level, with synthe-
sized scenes that are vi-
sually indistinguishable 
from recorded reality. 
Image processing ad-
vances have made it possible to find 
some kinds of artifacts that indicate 
tampering or wholesale synthesis. 
Light reflections, highlights, and shad-
ows also can be closely examined to 
reveal that different objects in a single 
“photograph” actually were assem-
bled from images that were in slightly 
different physical environments. 
In one dramatic demonstration in 
2009, computer scientist Hany Farid 
of Dartmouth College showed that a 
single “group picture” had been cre-
ated by pasting in people from differ-
ent photos because the reflection of the 
room lights on each person’s eyes were 
inconsistent with were they were stand-
ing in the frame. 
At the leading edge of digital foren-
sics research are systems that attempt 
to assist an analyst’s reasoning—to find 
evidence automatically that is out of 
the ordinary, strange, or inconsistent. 
Such details can indicate that there is 
a deeper, hidden story. Inconsisten-
cies can also indicate that evidence 
has been tampered with or entirely 
falsified. Ultimately, such automated 
reasoning systems are likely the only 
way that today’s analysts will be able 
to keep up with the vast quantities and 
increasing diversity of data in the com-
ing years. Progress in this area remains 
tricky, however. Some developments 
have been made on systems that can 
find timestamp inconsistencies (a file 
can’t be deleted before it is created), but 
such rules are invariably complicated 
by the messiness of the real world (for 
example, daylight savings time). 
A Faraday cage shields a cell phone from any outside radio signals, minimizing 
possible changes to the phone’s memory that might come from its connecting to 
the cell phone network; synchronizing data with the Internet; or receiving SMS 
messages, phone calls, or even a remote erase command. The analyst would 
normally keep the box closed for protection and work on the phone by using the 
internal camera. (Image courtesy of the Netherlands Forensic Institute.)
Digital artwork can be sufficiently lifelike that 
analytical techniques are needed to distinguish 
real photographs from fake ones. The image 
above was synthesized using the model shown 
at right. (Image courtesy of Dan Roarty.)
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Forging Ahead
For all its power, digital forensics faces 
stark challenges that are likely to grow 
in the coming years. Today’s comput-
ers have on average 1,000 times more 
storage but are only 100 times faster 
than the high-end workstations of the 
early 1990s, so there is less computing 
power available to process each byte 
of memory. 
The number of cases in which digital 
evidence is collected is rising far faster 
than the number of forensic investiga-
tors available to do the examinations. 
And police  now realize that digital evi-
dence can be used to solve crimes—that 
is, as part of the investigation process—
whereas in the past it was mainly a tool 
for assisting in convictions.
Cell phones may be equipped with 
“self-destruct” applications that wipe 
their data if they receive a particular 
text, so it is now standard practice to 
store phones in a shielded metal box, 
called a Faraday cage, which blocks ra-
dio waves. But many cell phones will 
“forget” their stored memory if left off 
for too long, so the Faraday cages must 
be equipped with power strips and 
cell phone chargers. Because many 
low-end cell phones have proprietary 
plugs, police must seize chargers as 
well. However, some phones will 
wipe their data if they can’t call home, 
whereas others will encrypt their data 
with algorithms too powerful for law 
enforcement to decipher.
Further complicating the investi-
gator’s job is the emergence of cloud 
computing and other technologies for 
storing data on the Internet. As a result 
of the cloud, there is no way to ensure 
that a seized cell phone actually holds 
the suspect’s data—the phone might 
simply be a tool for accessing a remote 
server. A law enforcement professional 
who is authorized to search a device 
may not have legal authority to use in-
formation on that device to access re-
motely stored data. Worse still, the data 
might be deleted in the meantime by 
one of the suspect’s collaborators.
Despite its technical sophistication 
and reliance on the minutiae of digital 
systems, the single biggest challenge 
facing digital forensics practice today 
has a decidedly human dimension: the 
lack of qualified people to serve as re-
searchers and practitioners. Not mere-
ly the result of the general tech short-
age, the very nature of digital forensics 
makes staffing significantly harder 
than in other disciplines. Because the 
field’s mission is to understand any 
data that might be stored, we need 
individuals who have knowledge of 
both current and past computer sys-
tems, applications, and data formats. 
We need generalists in a technological 
society that increasingly rewards ex-
perts and specialization. 
One way to address this training 
problem is to look for opportunities 
to break down forensic problems into 
modular pieces so that experts in 
related fields can make meaningful 
contributions. I believe that another 
approach is to show how the under-
lying principles and current tools of 
digital forensics can be widely applied 
throughout our society. This relevancy 
should increase research into tools 
and hopefully expand the user base of 
the software.
Many of the tools of digital foren-
sics can be used for privacy auditing. 
Instead of finding personal informa-
tion that might be relevant to a case, 
businesses and individuals can use 
the tools to look for the inappropriate 
presence of personal information left 
behind because of bugs or oversight. 
Likewise, individuals can use pro-
grams such as file carvers to recover 
photographs that have been acciden-
tally deleted from digital cameras.
More generally, as our cars, street 
signs, communication systems, electri-
cal networks, buildings, and even so-
cial interactions are increasingly com-
puterized, digital forensics is likely to 
be one of the only ways of understand-
ing these systems when they misbe-
have—or when they are subverted. 
Without developing fundamentally 
new tools and capabilities, forensics ex-
perts will face increasing difficulty and 
cost along with ever-expanding data 
size and system complexity. Thus to-
day’s digital detectives are in an arms 
race not just with criminals, but also 
with the developers of tomorrow’s 
computer systems.
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Many system users and developers 
assumed that it was not possible to restore 
deleted files until data recovery experts 
developed tools that proved otherwise. 
